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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to forecast the size and effects of remittances and emigration in 
four Western-Balkan countries: Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Kosovo, through application 
of a qualitative forecasting method: a Delphi questionnaire. We solicited consensus building 
within and between two groups of respondents: 10 experts and 20 receivers were consulted 
per country in three subsequent rounds - two on the same group, and a third cross-round 
whereby average answers of receivers were given to experts, and vice versa. Consensual 
results suggest that remittances in the projected five-year period will increase in Macedonia 
and Serbia, and will reduce in Albania and Kosovo. With lower consensus, results forecast 
that emigration will decelerate in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, and will accelerate in 
Serbia by 2021. Emigration effects for the society have been forecasted to be predominantly 
negative due to skilled labour emigration, while remittances were forecasted to maintain their 
effect on poverty in Macedonia and Serbia, and weaken it in Albania. In all four countries, 
expert and receivers were in agreement that remittances will continue to support current 
consumption only. On the other hand, Macedonians lacked consensus on remittances’ effect 
on the labour market, whereby experts agreed that remittances will support inactivity, while 
receivers – employment. On the other hand, there has been a consensus achieved in the other 
three countries that remittances will support labour-market activity.  
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1. Introduction 
The Western Balkans6 have been always known by facing large emigration rates and hence 
having large diaspora. At the end of 2013, 5.7 million persons originating from the Western 
Balkans live abroad, bringing the emigration rate at 31.2% (World Bank), ranging from 
18.2% of total population in Serbia to a rampant 45.3% in Montenegro. Only after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, 3.5 million individuals left the region. Hence, the emigration rate 
has been at 19.4%, and ranging from 9.1% in Serbia to 38.5% in Albania. As a consequence, 
remittance flows have been sizable: the entire region received 8.6 billion USD in 2015, 
ranging from 3.1% of GDP in Macedonia to 16.7% in Kosovo. These figures still 
considerably exceed the inflows from foreign direct investment and official development 
assistance, 5 and 2.4 billion USD, respectively, hence reflecting the massive dependence of 
region’s economies on the money the diaspora sends back.  
The micro- and macroeconomic impact of remittances has been widely documented in the 
literature. At the macro-level, remittances stabilize the balance of payment, hence 
contributing to closing the large and persistent trade gaps in many countries, and preserving 
macroeconomic stability (World Bank, 2005; Ratha, 2005; 2007; Bugamelli and Paterno, 
2009; Chami et al. 2009; Gupta et al. 2009). At the micro-level, development effects of 
remittances, with certain extent of variety, have been documented for poverty alleviation, 
improving education and health outcomes, improving income distribution, stirring 
entrepreneurial spirit and the like (Adams and Page 2005; Hildebrandt and McKenzie 2005; 
Fajnzylber and Lopez 2007; Valero-Gil 2009; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2011). Our previous 
research showed large social and development effects of remittances in the Western Balkans 
(see Petreski and Jovanovic, eds. 2013; and Petreski and Petreski, eds. 2016, for comparative 
overviews).  
The Great economic crisis (2007-2011), followed by the European debt crisis (2012-2013) 
created concerns that external resource flows to developing countries may undergo 
precipitous declines, which could then adversely affect the basic development indicators and 
potentially reverse some achievements over the preceding decade (World Bank, 2009). After 
the crisis hit the region in 2008, the average annual decline of remittances received in the 
                                                             
6 The institutions of the European Union and its member states have defined the "Western Balkans" as the south-
east European area that includes countries that are not members of the European Union, while others refer to the 
geographical aspects. We herewith count with the following countries: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Until assuming EU membership, Croatia was also a part of the Western 
Balkans. 
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Western Balkans has been 1.8%, yet with distinct patterns across countries. Hence, while 
remittances inflow in the Western Balkans preserved relative stability, they showed not to be 
counter-cyclical, as the literature usually asserts (Avendano et al. 2011; Ratha, 2010). In 
addition, with the economic crisis and the fall of the Schengen wall in part of the Western 
Balkans, these countries faced acceleration of emigration. Entire families, including more 
educated individuals and families leave for better life. These notions open the question if the 
magnitude of remittances sent could be maintained for a long time, hence potentially 
undermining their social and developmental effects onto origin countries. Therefore, 
policymakers in the region may benefit a forward-looking analysis about emigration rates and 
remittances. 
The paper aims to forecast the size and effects of remittances and emigration in four Western-
Balkan countries: Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Kosovo, through application of qualitative 
method: a Delphi questionnaire. To our knowledge, qualitative method in migration and 
remittances’ forecasting has not been applied in the literature and, hence, represents the main 
novelty this paper brings to the literature. In addition, we apply the Delphi method by 
consensus building within and between two groups of respondents: experts and remittances, 
which has not been done before either. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the existing literature on 
forecasting migration and remittances flows. Section 3 elaborates the underlying 
methodology. Section 4 presents the results and offers a discussion. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background literature 
Remittances have been rarely forecasted, even in the global literature. When forecasted, it has 
been usually done at the macro-level using relatively simple quantitative models (e.g. 
Mohapatha and Ratha, 2010; Adedokun, 2013; Gherboveţ, 2014; Schmidt and Fertig, 2000). 
Factors like the stock of migrants, income levels at destination and origin, costs for remitting, 
exchange rates, interest rate differentials, but also duration of emigration, frequency of family 
visits and others, have been accounted for in the literature, when attempting to predict the 
future developments with remittances and migration. However, as Mohapatra and Ratha 
(2010: 205) note: “While remittances are influenced by all of the above factors, their use in a 
forecasting exercise is constrained by the lack of reliable forecasts of the future evolution of 
these explanatory variables.” Mohapatra and Ratha (2010) model remittances in a gravity-like 
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model, whereby the main determinants are incomes at origin and destination, assuming the 
stock of migrants remains unchanged. Their model correctly predicted the modest decline of 
remittances following the global crisis. Thanasi (2013) and Adedokun (2013), on the other 
hand, used a set of time-series methods to forecast the trend of remittances in Albania and 
Nigeria, respectively. While the effort is worth contemplating about, it may be too naïve by 
not considering other factors that determine remittances flows, primarily the income of the 
emigrants and the needs of the household at origin. 
Migration has been forecasted more frequently, nevertheless. This has been done in a similar 
context – either through following past deterministic trends or through devising a form of a 
gravity model (Kupiszewski, 1998). For example, Layard et al. (1992) is forecasting the East-
West migration in Europe after the EU enlargement, by extrapolating earlier findings on the 
South-North Europe and Mexico-US migration that happened earlier. Similarly, Franzmeyer 
and Brücker (1997), based on a gravity equation of net migration between Central and 
Eastern Europe and the then EU-15, forecasted a 0.08 to 0.16% emigration caused by 10% 
income gap in favor of EU-15. This study predicted a population outflow from Central and 
Eastern Europe to the EU-15 ranging between 590 and 1,180 thousand persons a year, 
depending on the pace of income convergence. Other studies widely used econometric 
gravity-like regressions in forecasting migration; some include: Alvarez-Plata et al. (2003); 
Sinn et al. (2001); Schmidt and Fertig (2000); Dustmann et al. (2003); Brücker and 
Siliverstovs (2006); Boeri and Brücker (2001) and many others. An overview of the 
economic model and econometric tools utilized in the migration forecasting could be found in 
Bijan (2006). 
Despite the general trend to forecast migration flows in quantitative frameworks, few studies 
attempted to predict migration size based on surveys. For example, Drbohlav (1996) used a 
two-round Delphi method on a sample of 70 experts in the first round and 39 in the second 
one, and obtained rough estimates of the magnitude and timing of the expected East-West 
migration flows in Europe. Fassmann and Hintermann (1997) and IOM (1998) use large 
surveys of individuals whereby they were asked about their intentions to leave the country 
and, based on their responses, a probability is derived on emigration patterns. 
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3. Data and methodology 
This study is based on the application of the Delphi method. It originated in a series of studies 
that the RAND Corporation conducted in the 1950s, with the objective to develop a technique 
to obtain the most reliable consensus of a group of experts (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). The 
method structures a group communication, allowing the group of experts to deal with a 
complex problem, by arriving at a consensus through several rounds of provided feedback 
and subsequent revision (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). As Rowe et al. (1991) point out, 
typically, the method is used in cases where judgmental information is indispensable, through 
a series of questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback. 
The design of the Delphi questionnaire follows a similar pattern as the standard survey. It is 
usually composed if few questions, asking either a quantification of certain phenomenon, or 
delineating of several options in multiple-answer context. Alternatives in the latter case may 
be either set by the researcher, or derived from a pre-survey among a larger group of field 
specialists. Then, the appropriate group of respondents is selected; these usually represent 
field experts, sufficiently qualified to answer the questions. After the first round of surveying 
is conducted, a second-round questionnaire is designed, based on the first-round one, but also 
including the aggregate responses (results) of the first round. A questionnaire/survey is 
designed in a similar manner in each subsequent round, offering the aggregate result of the 
previous round. In each subsequent round, respondents have the opportunity to revise their 
answer, based on the new set of information provided. The process is reiterated until 
satisfactory degree of consensus is reached. The respondents are kept anonymous to each 
other (though not to the researcher) throughout the process. The final output is formed from 
the aggregation of all individual opinions. A more detailed technical execution of the Delphi 
method is presented in Okoli and Pawlowski (2004), while a neat literature review on the 
revived interest in the application of the Delphi method could be found in Landeta (2006). 
Devised in this way, the Delphi method is considered to have the consensus measurement as 
its key component. However, Dajani et al. (1979) argue that group stability has to bee 
achieved beforehand, i.e. that consensus may be meaningless without group stability. They 
define group stability as “the consistency of responses between successive rounds of a study” 
(p.84). 
For the purpose of this study, we devise the conduct of the Delphi method as follows. In each 
of the four countries, we devise two groups of respondents: i) about ten field experts; and ii) 
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about 20 remittance-receivers per country. The experts are chosen by following their field 
expertise, i.e. persons who research and/or are professionally investigating the dynamics of 
migration and remittances in each country. These include researchers at 
universities/institutes, professionals/researchers at the central banks and ministries of finance; 
professionals within agencies on migration/diaspora, bankers of foreign payments divisions 
and the like. This group is in the core of the Delphi design. The other group is composed of 
about 20 remittance-receivers. While this group is not composed of experts per se, we believe 
each remittance receiver who, hence, has a migrant abroad, may also provide a reliable 
judgment on the direction, size and effects of migration and remittances. 
Each group passed through two rounds of surveying. There is a third, bridging round. 
Namely, round two provided the aggregate result of the previous round conducted on the 
same group and potential revision of the opinions was solicited. The third round provided the 
aggregate result of the second round on the other group; experts were provided with the 
aggregate results of the receivers’ group, and vice versa, and potential revision invited. 
Hence, we are tracking the extent of consensus within groups, but also between groups. 
There has been much variety in the literature on the methods used to measure consensus and 
group stability; for neat overview see Von der Gracht (2012). In addition, standards for 
consensus measurement have never been rigorously set (Mitchell, 1991), supporting the 
uncontrolled growth in the ways to measure consensus (Meyrick, 2003). For the purpose of 
this study, we rely on the coefficient of variation to measure consensus level and change. 
Buck et al. (1993) argue that a consistent decrease of this coefficient between rounds would 
signify an increase in the consensus, while Zinn et al. (2001) and English and Keran (1976) 
argue a coefficient of variation at or below 50% to signify that a reasonably good internal 
agreement has been reached. We set slightly lower cut-off rate of 40%, suggesting that the 
consensus of 60% (calculated as 1 – coefficient of variation) would be considered satisfactory 
for this study and a stop point after at least two rounds for the same group (hence, not 
counting the cross round) have been conducted.  
To measure groups’ stability, we rely on three measures. The first one is a standard t-test, 
which has been widely used in the literature (e.g. Hakim and Weinblatt, 1993; Buck et al. 
1993). We use two variants of the test: for paired samples between round one and two, since 
we follow the answers’ evolution of the same sample; and for independent samples between 
round two and three, since we compare experts with receivers. The second test is the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test whose null is that the two samples follow the same distribution. 
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Finally, we count the share of individual responses which were maintained between rounds in 
the total number of answers. For the questions with continuous underlying variable, we 
consider an answer to be maintained when the subsequent round answer belongs to +/- one 
standard deviation of the previous round, while for the categorical-variable questions we 
require that the same answer is obtained again. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Consensus forecasts 
We start analysing the results of the Delphi exercise by presenting some results about the 
achieved consensus. In all cases, the consensus within groups exceeded 60% even in the first 
round, then ascending to over 70%, or even close to or above 80% in the second round. These 
were considered quite satisfactory levels of consensus, adding robustness to the consensual 
forecasts, as well providing grounds for terminating the within-group number of rounds.  
As the third round was between-group one (experts were given the second-round answers of 
remittances, and vice versa), we were also interested in the between-group consensus, which 
is given in Table 1. Not surprisingly, in the majority of cases, the consensus further increase, 
when compared with own-group consensus of the previous round, but also compared with 
other-group consensus of the previous round. Still, in terms of the latter, there are some 
notable exceptions. Firstly, the largest consensus drops are observed in two cases: in the case 
of emigration-size forecasting, and of remittances effect onto the labour market. Second, it is 
evident that experts’ consensus was predominantly reduced when they were given the results 
of receivers, i.e. they were considerably reluctant to change their opinion which was different 
than receivers’ one, but this information inflicted noise/variability in experts’ opinions. On 
the other hand, receivers tended to more easily approximate/agree with experts’ opinion. 
Slight exception is Serbia, where both groups were noised with the answer of the other group, 
i.e. refused to change their mind easily. 
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Table 1 – Between-group consensus 
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 Round II, receivers 66.70% 90.80% 93.90% 82.10% 93.90% 86.50% 
Round III, experts 86.30% 64.60% 100.00% 89.50% 100.00% 68.40% 
Round II, experts 76.50% 65.00% 84.20% 84.20% 100.00% 84.20% 
Round III, receivers 86.20% 89.30% 93.90% 88.80% 100.00% 84.30% 
Se
rb
ia
 
Round II, receivers 75.80% 67.90% 88.80% 75.30% 88.80% 81.70% 
Round III, experts 88.20% 68.90% 84.20% 79.30% 89.50% 61.30% 
Round II, experts 84.90% 78.20% 84.20% 79.30% 89.50% 68.40% 
Round III, receivers 80.90% 69.90% 88.80% 77.60% 90.60% 79.80% 
A
lb
an
ia
 Round II, receivers 56.52% 72.31% 77.64% 85.36% 79.77% 77.64% 
Round III, experts 81.24% 79.53% 79.30% 79.30% 74.18% 61.27% 
Round II, experts 76.31% 52.21% 79.30% 74.18% 74.18% 68.38% 
Round III, receivers 80.92% 67.45% 75.28% 79.77% 77.64% 75.28% 
K
o
so
vo
 Round II, receivers 80.80% 57.60% 80.40% 84.40% 80.40% 78.20% 
Round III, experts 83.30% 60.60% 68.40% 61.30% 84.20% 68.40% 
Round II, experts 86.00% 41.10% 68.40% 84.20% 84.20% 68.40% 
Round III, receivers 86.00% 76.90% 75.80% 86.30% 84.40% 86.30% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Delphi survey. 
 
We turn to observing the consensual forecasts now. Figure 1 presents the consensual 
forecasts for the remittances’ flows in the next five years in the four investigated countries. 
The graph offers a set of information: the size of remittances in 2016; the variation in the 
responses of both groups (presented through the minimal and maximal forecast across 
rounds); and the achieved consensus after the final third cross-round. We first note that 
forecasts are positive for Macedonia and Serbia; and negative for Albania and Kosovo. In all 
cases except Albania, experts had lower forecast variation; and in the same cases, the final 
consensus has been geared toward the lower bounds of experts’ and remittances’ opinion. In 
Albania, receivers were more convinced in their forecasts than in the other three countries, 
and hence experts finally agreed closed to receivers’ range of forecasts and close to experts’ 
upper bound forecast. Overall, it is forecast that remittances flowing in Macedonia and Serbia 
will rise in the next five-year period for 9% and 17.4%, respectively, implying an annual 
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increase of 1.8% and 3.3%, respectively. On the other hand, the consensual forecast for 
Albania and Kosovo suggest annual remittances’ decline of 4.5% and 2.2%, respectively.  
Figure 1 – Remittances’ forecasts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Delphi survey. 
Similarly, Figure 2 presents the same set of information on the emigration forecasts. The 
consensual forecast is that emigration will subside in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, but 
will increase in Serbia, in the next five-year period. Noticeably, these results have been 
characterized by more variability, hence with lower level of consensus among the 
respondents. For instance, in the case of Macedonia, the lack of consensus is visible by the 
non-overlapping ranges of experts and receivers (also reflected in consensus deterioration in 
Table 1), although by the end of the exercise, consensus improved and the final forecast is 
slight reduction of emigration of 3% in 2021. With smaller variation yet feeble consensus, the 
forecast for Albania suggested a decrease of emigration of 22% in the same year. The 
variation and consensus appeared better in Kosovo and Serbia, where respondents were 
finally in agreement that emigration will decelerate by 9% and accelerate by 13.5% in 2021, 
respectively. 
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Figure 2 – Emigration forecasts 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Delphi survey. 
Table 2 provides the consensual forecasts on the remaining questions of our Delphi survey, 
which refer to the effects of emigration and remittances. Both groups achieved consensus in 
most of the cases. For instance, emigration effects for the society have been forecasted to be 
negative due to skilled labour emigration. However, there is no consensus on this aspect in 
Kosovo, where experts continued to consider the effect positive due to the sheer size of 
remittances the economy receives (see Figure 1). Similarly, it is only in Kosovo where 
experts and receivers were not in agreement on the effect of remittances for poverty: the 
former agreed it would become weaker, while the former it would remain as is. Still, we need 
to note here that the agreed answer of Kosovar experts is not in agreement with their 
consensual result about emigration effect. While in the other three countries, experts and 
receivers ended up with consensus, it is notable that they agreed about maintaining 
remittances’ effect on poverty in Macedonia and Serbia, while about reduction in Albania. 
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Table 2 – Consensus forecasts on emigration and remittances effects 
  The emigration 
effects 
Remittances' 
effect on 
poverty 
Remittances' 
usage 
Remittances' effect 
on labor market 
M
ac
ed
o
n
ia
 
Experts Negative, educated 
depart 
As is Current 
consumption 
Inactivity 
Receivers Negative, educated 
depart 
As is Current 
consumption 
Employment  
Se
rb
ia
 
Experts Negative, educated 
depart 
As is Current 
consumption 
Employment / Self-
employment 
Receivers Negative, educated 
depart 
As is Current 
consumption 
Employment  
A
lb
an
ia
 Experts Negative, educated 
depart 
Weaker Current 
consumption 
Employment / Self-
employment 
Receivers Negative, educated 
depart 
Weaker Current 
consumption 
Employment / Self-
employment 
K
o
so
vo
 Experts Positive, because of 
remittances 
Weaker Current 
consumption 
Employment  
Receivers Negative, educated 
depart 
As is Current 
consumption 
Employment  
Source: Delphi survey. 
 
In all four countries, expert and receivers were in agreement that remittances will continue to 
support current consumption only; this is the question with the larges consensus achieved 
even as of the earlier rounds. On the other hand, Macedonia and Serbia see a disagreement on 
the remittances’ effect on the labour market, the consensus being especially absent in 
Macedonia. Namely, experts agreed that remittances will support inactivity, while receivers – 
employment. In Serbia, on the other hand, both groups agreed remittances will support 
activity, albeit experts – employment, while receivers – self-employment. Finally, there has 
been a consensus achieved in Albania and Kosovo, that remittances will support activity. The 
last question exhibited the lowest consensus within the entire Delphi process. 
 
4.2. Results stability 
This section presents forecasts’ stability, by question, by country (Table 2). In the case of the 
t-test for paired samples, we test the null that sample means/proportions are the same between 
the two first and the second round; with the Wilcoxson signed-rank test, we test the null that 
responses’ distribution was maintained between rounds, and this test is feasible only for the 
continuous-variable questions, i.e. those on the amount of remittances and the size of 
emigration; and finally observe the share of responses that were maintained between rounds. 
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Table 2 – Results stability 
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M
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Ex
p
er
ts
 T-test 0.148 0.702 1.000 0.323 1.000 0.323 
Wilcoxon test 0.097 0.721         
Maintained shares 70% 40% 70% 40% 90% 50% 
R
ec
ei
ve
rs
 
T-test 0.698 0.103 0.001 0.398 0.033 0.742 
Wilcoxon test 0.476 0.168         
Maintained shares 82% 76% 53% 47% 65% 59% 
Se
rb
ia
 
Ex
p
er
ts
 T-test 1.000 0.503 1.000 0.591 1.000 0.555 
Wilcoxon test 1.000 0.831         
Maintained shares 80% 90% 80% 70% 100% 80% 
R
ec
ei
ve
rs
 
T-test 0.442 0.891 0.425 0.776 0.577 0.853 
Wilcoxon test 0.55 1.000         
Maintained shares 45% 85% 80% 75% 95% 55% 
A
lb
an
ia
 
Ex
p
er
ts
 T-test 0.09 0.85 0.26 0.72 0.79 0.59 
Wilcoxon test 0.08 0.72         
Maintained shares 60% 80% 70% 50% 60% 80% 
R
ec
ei
ve
rs
 
T-test 0.87 0.76 0.58 0.82 0.92 1.000 
Wilcoxon test 0.14 0.49         
Maintained shares 85% 80% 75% 70% 80% 85% 
K
o
so
vo
 
Ex
p
er
ts
 T-test 0.861 0.923 0.678 0.726 0.84 0.811 
Wilcoxon test 0.838 0.919         
Maintained shares 60% 80% 50% 60% 60% 40% 
R
ec
ei
ve
rs
 
T-test 0.067 0.675 0.111 0.031 0.096 1.000 
Wilcoxon test 0.049 0.975         
Maintained shares 79% 90% 63% 68% 74% 79% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The share of individual responses between the rounds is calculated as follows: i) for the continuous 
variable, by considering a maintained result to be if it falls within +/- one standard deviation of the mean 
in the previous round; ii) for the categorical variables, if the respondent answered the same option. 
The three tests have the following description: 
 T-test of paired samples (H0: Sample means are the same / Sample proportions are the same) 
 Wilcoxon signed-rank test / Two-tailed test (H0: The two samples follow the same distribution) 
 Share of individual responses maintained between rounds 
 
The table suggests that results between rounds have been quite stable, concomitant to the 
improving consensus between rounds discussed at the beginning of Section 4.1. In Table 1 
there are few exceptions – cases where the null hypothesis has been rejected, or the share of 
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maintained responses between rounds has been less than arbitrary half – however we cannot 
determine any systematic pattern. This suggests that one could be satisfied with the achieved 
stability of responses in the overall exercises, in all four countries. 
 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
The objective of this paper is to forecast the size and effects of remittances and emigration in 
four Western-Balkan countries: Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Kosovo, through application 
of a qualitative forecasting method: a Delphi questionnaire. We challenged consensus for two 
groups of respondents: experts and remittance receivers. By so doing, we were able to track 
consensus building and arrive at forecasts both, within and between the two groups. In each 
of the four countries, 10 experts and about 20 remittance-receivers were consulted in three 
subsequent rounds, out of which the first two were on the same group, while the third round 
was a cross-round whereby average answers of receivers were given to experts, and vice 
versa. 
In general, consensus on almost all investigated issue was built even as of the first round, 
which then increased in the second round, and even further in the third round. However, it 
was notable that, in the third cross-round, experts were on average more reluctant to change 
and approximate their average answer to that of receivers, hence inflicting some noise in the 
results and reducing their consensus. In general, this did not happen with receivers in the 
third round. 
Results suggest that remittances in the projected five-year period will increase in Macedonia 
and Serbia, and will reduce in Albania and Kosovo, by 9%, 17.4%, -1.8% and -3.3%, 
respectively. With lower consensus, results forecast that emigration will decelerate in 
Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, and will accelerate in Serbia, by -3%, -22%, -9% and 
13.5%, in 2021. Emigration effects for the society have been forecasted to be negative due to 
skilled labour emigration, despite consensus on this issue is lacking in Kosovo. Similarly, it is 
only in Kosovo where experts and receivers were not in agreement on the effect of 
remittances for poverty: the former agreed it would become weaker, while the former it 
would remain as is. While in the other three countries, experts and receivers consensually 
forecasted maintaining remittances’ effect on poverty in Macedonia and Serbia, while 
weakening in Albania. In all four countries, expert and receivers were in agreement that 
remittances will continue to support current consumption only. On the other hand, 
14 
Macedonians lacked consensus on remittances’ effect on the labour market, whereby experts 
agreed that remittances will support inactivity, while receivers – employment. On the other 
hand, there has been a consensus achieved in the other three countries that remittances will 
support labour-market activity.  
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